Technical Annex - Applying SbD-ToE to the CI/CD Pipeline
This annex complements the case study on applying the SbD-ToE manual to the CI/CD pipeline as an L3 project, providing reusable technical and operational artefacts for engineering, security and governance teams.
✅ Validation Checkpoints by Phase
| Phase | Validation | Suggested tool | SbD-ToE chapter |
|---|---|---|---|
| Planning | Documented threat modelling | IriusRisk, Excel | Ch. 03 - Threat Model |
| Design | L3 requirements assigned to the project | Catalogue of Ch. 02, 07 | Ch. 02, 07 - Requirements |
| Implementation | Linters, mandatory review | Semgrep, ESLint, PRs | Ch. 06 - Secure Dev |
| Build | SBOM generated for the pipeline | syft, cyclonedx | Ch. 05, 07 |
| Tests | Security validations of the pipeline | trivy, semgrep, CI | Ch. 07, Ch. 10 |
| Deploy | Provenance and signing | cosign, slsa-provenance | Ch. 07, 09 |
| Operations | Logging, traceability, alerts | AuditLogs, Kibana | Ch. 12 - Monitoring and Operations |
🧩 Relevant User Stories
**Como engenheiro de DevOps**,
Quero que o pipeline da plataforma gere um SBOM próprio,
Para garantir que todas as tasks, containers e SDKs usados estão inventariados e rastreados.
**Como responsável de segurança**,
Quero aplicar threat modeling formal ao pipeline CI/CD,
Para identificar vetores de ataque e definir controlos preventivos.
**Como gestor de conhecimento**,
Quero que o processo de onboarding inclua formação sobre segurança do pipeline,
Para garantir que todos os contribuidores compreendem o impacto da infraestrutura de entrega.
**Como auditor de segurança**,
Quero validar se os runners utilizados estão isolados e corretamente configurados,
Para mitigar riscos de execução maliciosa ou persistência de agentes externos.
📜 Applicable Requirements
| ID | Description | Applicable | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| REQ-L3-001 | The pipeline must have a versioned SBOM per build | ✔ | Ch. 05, 07 |
| REQ-L3-014 | The runner used must be segregated by function | ✔ | Ch. 09 |
| REQ-L3-019 | The pipeline tasks must be analysed for vulnerabilities | ✔ | Ch. 05, 07 |
| REQ-L3-027 | Every change to the pipeline must go through review | ✔ | Ch. 06 |
| REQ-L3-038 | The pipeline must be subject to explicit threat modelling | ✔ | Ch. 03, 07 |
| REQ-L3-045 | The pipeline must undergo automated security testing | ✔ | Ch. 07, 10 |
| REQ-L3-048 | There must be logging and traceability of runs | ✔ | Ch. 12 |
| REQ-L3-052 | Training of teams on CI/CD security | ✔ | Ch. 13 |
📋 Operational Checklist
| Item | Yes/No |
|---|---|
| Has the pipeline been formally classified as an L3 asset? | |
| Is there a documented threat model, reviewed periodically? | |
| Are the runners used segregated and controlled? | |
| Does the pipeline itself have a generated and signed SBOM? | |
| Are the tasks used (e.g. GitHub Actions, SDKs) inventoried? | |
| Are the pipeline dependencies subject to SCA analysis? | |
Is the ci-pipeline.yml versioned and subject to mandatory review? | |
| Have secure development practices been applied to the pipeline? | |
| Is there a formal exception and review process for bypasses? | |
| Has training on secure CI/CD been delivered to the relevant teams? | |
| Have security tests been applied to the pipeline? | |
| Is end-to-end traceability ensured (build → deploy)? |
✅ Final Considerations
This annex translates the narrative prescription of the case study into concrete and auditable technical elements, promoting the effective and traceable adoption of SbD-ToE in the lifecycle of the pipelines themselves.
📌 The pipeline is a critical asset. Treating its lifecycle like that of any other L3 product is a fundamental step towards maturity in supply chain security.