Method for deriving abuse and misuse cases — cross-functional workshop, adversarial user stories and integration into the requirements backlog. Adversarial elicitation technique that feeds the threat model and the security requirements; it complements structured threat modelling, it does not replace it.
Reinforced recommendations for organisations with high maturity or demanding normative requirements
Traceability model between ARC requirements, threats, architectural decisions and auditable evidence, with a matrix template and update criteria
Structured identification, analysis and mitigation of threats during the development lifecycle
Integration of threat modelling throughout the development cycle
How to integrate threat modelling practices into technical architecture artefacts and approval processes
Technical and process indicators for assessing the coverage, quality and integration of threat modelling in the development cycle, with thresholds by risk level and mapping to the cross-cutting SbD-ToE governance dimensions.
The LINDDUN methodology for privacy threat modelling — the seven threat categories, mapping to data flow diagrams and application to any system with personal or regulated data, at all levels. It complements security threat modelling (STRIDE); it does not replace the legal compliance assessment.
Terms used in Chapter 04 with operational definitions and associated artefacts
Identification and treatment of the risks inherent to the Threat Modelling process, regardless of the method used
Binary, auditable checklist of the adoption of the threat modelling practices of Chapter 03
Canonical catalogue of structural and design security requirements (ARC-001 to ARC-013), organised by risk level, with acceptance criteria for architecture reviews, ADRs and technical audits.
Combining get_threat_landscape + consult_security_requirements by concern to produce grounded threat models.
Application of the LINDDUN model to identify privacy threats in an authentication system
Complete example with DFD, STRIDE and mitigation in an authentication service with JWT
Requirements and practical validations to ensure the existence, integrity and impact of threat modelling in the CI/CD lifecycle
Organisational policy that defines the mandatory nature, methodology, execution triggers, formal approval requirements, traceability and management of threat modelling artefacts throughout the lifecycle of applications classified L2 and L3.
Acceptance criteria, human validation and minimum evidence for threat models